Grenada’s electoral system: Integrity, transparency and accountability

by Sandra Ferguson 

I write in my personal, individual capacity. As Grenada prepares for its next elections, I want to express my concern about the integrity and transparency of Grenada’s Electoral System and the accountability of the Parliamentary Elections Office.

1. Concerns/Queries re Grenada’s Electoral System

Between the March 2018 elections and the June 2022 elections, I was part of the CSO collective, which engaged with the Parliamentary Elections Office and the Supervisor of Elections, raised a number of concerns and sought information.

1.1 Local Company, AZITS Solutions ^[1]: Providing Support to Parliamentary Elections Office

• PEO Press Conference, 10 January 2020: Via the press conference of the Parliamentary Elections Office, on 10 January, while it was dealing with the issue of the expiration of the Voter’s Registration card, we were quite surprised to learn that, since 2015-2016, IT support to the office was being provided by a local company, AZITS, registered in Pearls, St Andrew
• Letter of 11 January, 2020 to PEO: The civil society collective wrote to the PEO seeking information on the following: the process by which the company was awarded the contract, the identity of the manager/operator of the company, the services provided by this company to the PEO

 1.1.1. Comments/Observations

It was rather surprising, since, in 2016, the civil society collective had several discussions with the Parliamentary Elections Office leading up to the November Referendum on Constitutional Reform, and this information was not shared. The system was explained to us, including the security features of the system and the features which prevented duplication of registration of an individual.

• 3M Canada: We were aware of the contract of the Parliamentary Elections Office with 3M Canada to develop and install the new Voter Registration System and an option for maintenance services over a period of 5 years. The process of recruitment was transparent and inclusive. At a stakeholder consultation in December 2010, there was a presentation by the representative of 3M who identified the enhanced security features of the new system
• Who/What Is AZITS: The PEO did not respond to the 11 January 2020 letter so we the people tried to find some information via Google. This is what was noted: AZITS (A-Z Info Tech Solutions) is a Grenadian-based Information Technology Consultancy firm aimed at helping businesses thrive in the digital world. It was registered at Pearls, St Andrew’s. It would appear that the founder of this company was a Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance over the period April 2018 to July 2020. Did this company also provide services to/or had relations with citizens by investment or agents of citizenship by investment?

1.2 MGov E-Services Portal, Register to Vote, http://www.gov.gd/register-vote

In the last quarter of 2020, the collective became aware of this portal. The page advised/invited citizens of Grenada to register to vote via this page.

• Upload Registration Form and Related Information: Citizens were invited to register, complete the registration form and upload the registration form along with the digital fingerprints, passport photo, and digital copies of individual credentials as applicable to complete the registration: – official birth certificate or copy of passport, marriage certificate if applicable, et al; digital copy of signature
• 19 November 2019: This information was published on 19 November 2019 and updated on 11 January 2020.
• Contact Information: The contact information was the Prime Minister’s Office.

1.3 MGov Parliamentary Elections Office Portal, https://www.gov.gd/peo/registration:

This PEO portal advised that registration takes place ONLY at the constituency office. It listed the documents to be presented.

1.3.1 Comments/Observations

• Portal Management: According to the site, MGov Grenada, the content of the portal was managed centrally by the Information and Communications Technology Team under the Ministry of National Security, Administration, Home Affairs, Information and Communications Technology.
• Official Site of Parliamentary Elections Office, peo.org: One noted that, while the official site of the Parliamentary Elections Office did have useful information, the last posting, advised of the appointment of the Ag. Supervisor of Elections in March 2019.

1.4 Citizen by Investment: Application for Voter’s Registration Card

This local citizenship by investment and escrow agent ^[2] advised that the Parliamentary Elections Office issued Voter Registration Cards to citizens of Grenada at its Constituency Offices.

• Comments/Observations:
• Citizenship by Investment Local /Escrow Agent: Infinity,(Grenada) Inc. a local citizenship by investment agent, advised that it was “a licensed company which is a local agent and Escrow Agent and International Business Services Operation specialising in Immigration Programmes; Post-Immigration Services and Corporate and International Business Services”
• Application for Voter’s Registration Card ^[3]: Its website’s page on Application for Voter’s Registration advised that the Grenada Parliamentary Election Office (PEO) issues Voter Registration Cards to citizens of Grenada at the Constituency Offices. The requirements and process to register reflected the information on the MGov portal https://www.gov.gd/peo/registration.

2. CSO Communication to SoE/PEO

• Letter of 14 November 2020: The civil society collective raised the above-referenced concerns under Section 1 with the Supervisor of Elections via a Letter of 14 November 2020.
• 30 July 2021: Response of the Supervisor of Elections: Via letter of 30 July, 2021, the Supervisor of Elections responded to the Letter of 14 November, 2020, advising as follows:
  • The Parliamentary Elections Office, Official Website was managed at its main office
  • The Parliamentary Elections Office was not responsible for the content published through other media
  • The Parliamentary Elections Office reiterated that the registration of electors was governed by the Representation of the People Act, CAP. 286A. Therefore, the allegations with reference to online registration were not in keeping with the process as obtained by this office
• 2021, 30 November: CSO Response to the Letter to SoE: This response to the letter of the Supervisor of Elections noted as follows:
  • Avoided treating with the Significant/Critical Issues: The response of the Supervisor of Elections had avoided treating with the significant and critical issues that were identified in the letter of 14 November 2020
  • Deflected Attention: Instead, it had deflected attention by alluding to “ the allegations with reference to the online registration” and refusing to address a very serious issue of the Government of Grenada website — http://www.gov.gd/register-vote — inviting “citizens” to register online and submit documents electronically — contrary to the requirements of the Representation of the People Act, which required persons to register in the constituency office
  • Integrity of Voter Registration System/Electoral Process: These issues threatened the integrity of the voter registration system and, by extension, the electoral process
  • Provisions of Constitution, Section 35(6): The response further referred to the provisions of Grenada’s Constitution, Section 35(6): “In the exercise of his functions under the foregoing provisions of this section, the Supervisor of Elections shall not be subject to the direction and control of any other persons or authority”
  • 2022, 14 June: Letter to the Parliamentary Elections Office/Supervisor of Elections:
    This letter summarised the concerns raised in the previous 2 letters to the Supervisor of Elections and was shared with the OAS Election Observer Mission

3. 2022, 23 June: General Elections:

On election day, 23 June 2022, I decided that, notwithstanding the concerns and lack of confidence that I had in the Grenada’s Voter Registration and Electoral Process, I would exercise my citizen’s duty and cast my vote. I decided that I would deliberately spoil my vote so that during the count, it would be counted as rejected/spoilt. My action turned out to be most revealing/informative/instructive for me.

3.1 Results of Polling Station K09, South-east St George

By November 2022, we the people had access to the 2022 General Elections Results Summary produced by the Parliamentary Elections Office elections2022.gd. I was particularly interested in the results of Polling Station K09 of South-East St George where I had cast my vote over the last 4 elections — 2008, 2013, 2018 and 2022. The results were as follows:

• Votes Cast/Votes Allocated: Based on these results, there seems to be a small difference between the breakdown of votes and total votes cast
• Where is MY VOTE: Most important to me was MY vote… where was my spoilt/rejected vote accounted for? Since I deliberately spoilt my vote and there were no rejected/spoilt votes, I was in a position to ask this question
  • This vote would not affect the results but, to the best of my knowledge, it is required/expected that ALL votes are to be accounted for. A number of questions therefore arise: Was there a typographical error in the preparation of the summary report? Was there a counting error in respect of the ballots? Was my ballot allocated in error to one of the other categories?
• Letter of 10 November 2022 to SEO/PEO: Via letter of 10 November 2022, in my personal/individual capacity, I brought the matter to the attention of the Supervisor of Elections, expressing concern that a vote (my vote) was apparently not accounted for in these official results contained in the 2022 General Elections Summary. The letter was never acknowledged

3.2 Making Spoilt Votes Count

• Minimising Spoilt Votes: I attended 2 stakeholder meetings convened by the Parliamentary Elections Office post-Election 2022 — 6 July 2023 and 18 April 2024. The majority of attendees at the meeting of 18 April 2024 were Returning Officers, Presiding Officers, Poll Clerks, et al. At the second meeting, I reminded the Supervisor that, to date, I had not received any acknowledgement of my letter re my spoilt vote, which was not accounted for in the PEO’s Summary of Results. For me, this matter was not closed. But imagine my disbelief when a couple of the senior officers indicated that they tried to make all votes count and minimise spoiled votes!!?? That was certainly a revelation!!
• Election Day Observation of Caricom EOM: Of particular interest to me was the following Election Day Observation in the Preliminary Statement of the Caricom EOM: –
  • Different Approaches Voting Process/Counting Ballots: “It was witnessed that different approaches were employed to the voting process and the counting of the ballots. However, these remained in compliance with the overarching guidelines for the electoral process.”^[4]
• Counting/Allocating Spoilt Ballots: In respect of the counting of ballots, on what basis does an officer decide to allocate a spoilt ballot to any category other than reject, and is in compliance?

4. Election Observer Missions 2022

There were 2 Election Observer Missions in Grenada for Elections 2022 — the OAS EOM and the CARICOM EOM. To date, some of we the people are aware of or have seen the preliminary report of each mission. To date, the final reports of both missions have not been available. They are not on the website of the respective organisations.

4.1 Caricom EOM

This report was an agenda item of the Stakeholder Meeting of 6 July 2023, of the Parliamentary Elections Office.

• Recommendations: The Supervisor of Elections focussed on the recommendations of the Caricom EOM noting that the recommendations in respect of changes to the legislative framework and the creation of an Electoral Commission would require both electoral and constitution reform
• Need for New Voter Registration System: Another staff member advised on the need for a new Voter Registration system, noting that the current system was 12 years old and that the entity which had designed the system “had total control of us”
  • Certain certificates on the system had expired, and there was no manual or documentation on what was to be done in that event
  • The proposed new system would integrate with other departments and would be capable of disaggregating data and doing more analysis of the data collected during the registration process
  • It would be able to produce information significant to the economic development of the country
  • A review/audit of the Parliamentary Elections Office was also required to assess whether or not it was “fit for purpose”
• Stakeholder Queries: Among the queries of stakeholders were the following:
  • Costs: What would be the cost of the new system? Who/what was going to fund it?
  • Revenue Generation: Did the Parliamentary Elections Office intend to generate revenue from sale of information?
  • Mandate: Did the PEO have the mandate to engage in such activity?
  • Privacy of Individual’s Data: Would the privacy of the individual’s data collected by the Voter Registration process be compromised, given the proposed larger use of the collected data re generation of information
  • Data Management and Protection: Did the recently passed Data Protection Act protect the data generated by the Parliamentary Elections Office?
  • Broad-based stakeholder inclusion and participation: There should be engagement throughout the country by the Parliamentary Elections Office in respect of proposed reforms and the process to sensitise and obtain input and buy-in
  • Circulation of Report. The Supervisor committed to sharing the report with persons attending the meeting. It is unclear whether or not it was circulated. It was not shared with the 5 civil society representatives (from three CSOs) who attended.

4.1.1 Comments/Observations

• 12-Year-Old Voter Registration System: In 2010, the entity that was contracted to design and install the system was 3M Canada. The contract included an option for a maintenance agreement, $143,995 for 5 years. So that maintenance contract would have come to an end sometime in 2015
• Certain Certificates Expired: Certain certificates on the system had expired, and there was no manual or documentation on what was to be done in that event
  • AZITS: Via the press conference of the Parliamentary Elections Office, on 10 January, while it was dealing with the issue of the expiration of the Voter’s Registration card, the Supervisor of Elections advised that since 2015-2016, IT support to the office was being provided by a local company, AZITS. It was found out that this company was registered in Pearls, St Andrew
    • Selection/Criteria: On what basis was this company selected? What was the experience of this company or members of its staff
    • Maintenance Support: Was the company, which was now providing maintenance support, not aware of the expiry date of certain certificates, and support would be required? Were they unable to provide that support?
  • Integration with Other Departments/Disaggregating Data: The proposed new system would integrate with other departments and would be capable of disaggregating data and doing more analysis of the data collected
    • Other Departments: With which departments would the proposed voter registration system be integrated? What is the rationale for this integration?
    • Disaggregating/Analysis Data: Is this about profiling various segments of the voter population/soon to be voter population? For whom is this data being prepared? Would the Parliamentary Elections Office be facilitating psephology research?

4.2. OAS EOM Preliminary Report ^[5]

We the people reviewed the OAS EOM. The OAS EOM noted the following:

• Ten Years/Obsolete: The Voter ID card system had operated for over 10 years without substantial upgrades. Much of its hardware was now obsolete
• Duplicate Registration: The system lacked control tools to prevent duplicate registration, since it does not allow cross-checks across constituencies
• Recommendations: The OAS Mission offered the following recommendations:
  • Verification/Avoiding Duplication: The system should be redesigned to improve accuracy and inclusiveness by including a mechanism to carry out a verification process at a national level, avoiding duplicate registration
  • Picture of Each Voter on Electors List: In order to improve control and verification of electors’ identity and increase the transparency in the process, there should be the picture of each elector in the Voters’ List
• Detailed Report? The Preliminary Report noted that a detailed report, expanding on the Mission’s observations and recommendations, would be presented to the OAS Permanent Council in Washington, DC and shared with all stakeholders in Grenada

4.2.1. Comments/Observations:

Following up on the recommendations of the OAS Observer Elections Missions of 2003 and 2008, continuous registration and a new voter registration system were proposed. The contract was awarded to 3M Canada ^[6].

• Obsolete/Without Substantial Upgrades: In a presentation to a 7 December 2010 stakeholder meeting, the representative of 3M shared the following information on the proposed digital system: — upgrades were able to be integrated into the systems; a feature of the security of the system was a central data base; there were numerous back-up features so that historical data would not be lost e.g. as a result of natural disasters, fire; the system would not be accessible via internet access
  • Why were upgrades to the system not done? Are upgrades not a part of maintenance? Shouldn’t upgrades be part of the maintenance of the system?
• Duplicate Registration: A new digital system was proposed — an electronically controlled profile would be documented on a master control registration form and would include fingerprinting. The fingerprinting feature would eliminate the possibility of duplication of the person who was registered previously
• Voter Card Security: Among the advantages of the proposed system were:
  • Security Features: The new voter card would have many security features which would not be easily duplicated. It would also be more durable
  • Transparency and Accountability: The stock material would be serialised – thus, one would be able to account for wastage and usage, making this system more transparent and accountable
  • Tracking Changes: Any changes to information would be tracked — every single log in by users would be recorded and changes appended
• Final OAS EOM Report: To date, the final report of the OAS Election Observer Mission has not been made available. Usually, it can be found on the website of the OAS. Did the current administration object to the report? Did it object to the public dissemination of the report. If so, why?

4.3 Unavailability of EOM Reports

• The unavailability of the reports of the Election Observer Mission is incomprehensible. It is very strange that the Parliamentary Elections Office should commit to sharing the report of the Caricom EOM and renege on this commitment even though the recommendations for the change in Voter Registration System seems to be based on recommendations of this Report.
• It is curious that neither of the major political parties have made any statements. It was the prior Opposition Leader, then Prime Minister, who requested the Observer Missions and formalised the arrangements. Why has the Opposition not expressed concerns that the reports were not made public? The designate of the current government would be the one receiving the report. Was the report received? Why has the report not been shared

5. Consultations on New Voter Registration System

• The PEO planned a series of consultations across the country – beginning on 21 May 2024 — intended to inform registered voters about a proposed upgraded registration system that the office intended to procure, acquire and install sometime before the next constitutionally due general elections in 2027
• A new Superintendent of Elections was appointed effective June
• Consultations were suspended and were not resumed

5.1 Lack of Transparency/Lack of Accountability

It is unclear whether a “new, improved” voter registration system was procured and installed. One noted the notice issued by the PEO re the “breakdown” of the system: – The issue with our main computer/server, which facilitates voter registration, has been rectified. All our offices are now able to process registration.^[7] A paucity of information seems to characterise the PEO.

6. Role of the Citizen

The citizen is the most important stakeholder of the Electoral Process. Via elections, the citizens will decide who they will choose to manage their affairs for the next period of five years. Integrity, transparency and accountability are essential. We the people deserve integrity, transparency and accountability of our electoral system!! We must demand integrity, transparency and accountability of the parliamentary elections office!!

[1] https://azits.net/; accessed at 1/16/2020

[2] http://www.infinitygrenada.com/voters-registration-card; accessed 11/14/2020

[3] Ibid

[4] https://caricom.org/preliminary-statement-from-caricom-election-observation-mission-to-grenada/

[5] https://nowgrenada.com/2022/06/oas-electoral-observation-mission-reports-for-grenada-general-elections-2022/

[6] The Supervisor of Elections clarified that when she took up office, the process of changing the current voter registration system was already “a work in progress”.  Two providers had already been identified – 3M from Canada and a provider out of Jamaica. However, the provider from Jamaica did not respond to requests for clarification and information about the security features of the system. Therefore, following consultation with the OAS, the contract had been awarded to 3M from Canada. The company had worldwide experience in designing systems for identification cards, driver’s licences and passports.

[7] https://nowgrenada.com/2025/04/parliamentary-elections-office-computer-system-challenges-resolved/

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