by Sir Ronald Sanders
Ambassador of Antigua and Barbuda to the United States and the OAS, and Dean of the OAS Ambassadors accredited to the OAS
When powerful states act, small states are tempted to personalise the action. When small states fragment, powerful states do not need to explain themselves.
That is the lesson Caricom should draw from the recent US decision to impose partial visa restrictions and to pause the issuance of certain immigrant visas — commonly known as green cards — to nationals of several countries, including Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica.
Across the region, a misleading narrative quickly took hold. Opposition parties and political actors rushed to portray the US action as a sanction against governments in power, each tailoring the claim to domestic political advantage. Some governments stayed silent. One appeared to exult, pleased that neighbours had been named while it had not.
That reaction revealed more about Caribbean weakness than American intent. The truth, supported by US statements and data, is that this is not a diplomatic punishment directed at Caribbean governments. It is a domestic US policy decision, driven by internal political and financial considerations that extend far beyond the Caribbean.
A domestic policy, not a Caribbean rebuke
The US review rests on 2 stated concerns. First, public expenditure. US authorities have pointed to data showing that a significant proportion of immigrant households eventually draw on public assistance. President Donald Trump has been explicit that immigrants must be financially self-sufficient and must not become a burden on American taxpayers. One may debate the policy, but it is neither novel nor unlawful within US immigration practice.
Second, demographic and political distortion. Overstayers who remain in the United States illegally are nevertheless counted in population totals that shape congressional representation and federal funding. In a polarised America, this is not a technical matter; it goes to political power and legitimacy.
These concerns explain why the pause applies to immigrant visas, not to tourist, student, or business travel. They also explain why the list of affected countries is global, spanning Africa, Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and much of the Caribbean. This is domestic policymaking, not diplomatic retaliation.
The numbers underline the point. US data show that across Caricom the percentage of immigrant households receiving public assistance is fairly high:
| Antigua and Barbuda | 41.9% |
| Dominica | 45.1% |
| St Lucia | 41.7% |
| Guyana | 41.7% |
| Belize | 41.8% |
| Grenada | 40.7% |
| St Kitts and Nevis | 39.1% |
| St Vincent and the Grenadines | 38.1% |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 37.1% |
| Jamaica | 36.7% |
| The Bahamas | 34.0% |
| Barbados | 33.9% |
| Haiti | 52.3% |
These figures are not judgements on governments; they are actuarial inputs into US domestic assessments of public charge risk.
Why B-1/B-2 visas are also affected
There is, however, another issue that must be addressed honestly: the restriction on new B-1/B-2 visitor visas for Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica.
This measure is tied primarily to concerns about visa overstaying, unlawful residence, and the use of public services — particularly healthcare — without payment. These concerns intersect with Citizenship by Investment programmes, not because such programmes are illegitimate, but because US law enforcement agencies believe identity verification must be strengthened.
President Trump stated this plainly in his Proclamation, noting that CBI programmes have historically been susceptible to risks, including the concealment of identity or assets to evade travel or financial restrictions. Enhanced biometric systems are intended to address those risks.
It is also widely understood that nationals of several other Caricom countries — though not formally listed — are already experiencing heightened scrutiny and informal visa refusals. pending agreement on improved biometric arrangements. This is not selective punishment; it is a demand for deeper verification.
Sovereignty cuts both ways
Another truth must be stated plainly. The United States has the sovereign right to regulate entry to its territory, to pause visa categories, and to deport persons who are unlawfully present and dependent on the public purse. Every Caricom state exercises the same authority. We deny entry. We deport overstayers. We enforce immigration laws when national interest requires it.
To deny the US this right would be hypocritical and diplomatically unsound. The issue is not authority; it is how consequences are managed, especially for lawful travellers who comply with the law.
Where the Caribbean failed itself
If the US action is understandable — even if debatable — the Caribbean response has been weak.
There was no coordinated Caricom position, no early joint clarification, no collective insistence on fact over fiction. Instead, there was silence, finger-pointing, and political theatre. Governments calculated how to protect themselves individually rather than how to protect the region collectively.
That fragmentation had predictable results. When the US State Department later published its broader list, it became clear that 11 of the 14 independent Caricom states were affected. Fragmentation did not buy protection; it merely delayed recognition.
This is the Caricom contradiction laid bare. We consult, but too often do not conclude. We proclaim unity, but practise unilateralism when pressure comes. Self-censorship — anticipating what a powerful partner expects and adjusting behaviour accordingly — has replaced collective resolve.
Fragmentation does not preserve sovereignty. It surrenders it, piece by piece.
A better path
What is needed now is neither outrage nor inter-Caribbean recrimination. Caricom governments should consult to agree on a common framework for engagement with the United States — one that distinguishes illegal overstayers from lawful travellers; separates individual public charge assessments from national reputation; and addresses biometric and identity-verification concerns through collective, technically sound solutions.
Any cooperation offered should be transparent, voluntary and capped. If not, each country will continue to do what they are doing now — every man for himself.
When small states quarrel among themselves over another country’s domestic policy, they do not influence outcomes; they merely endure them. Sovereignty for small states is not defended by silence, nor by opportunism, nor by celebrating a neighbour’s discomfort. It is defended by coherence, discipline, and the courage to speak with one voice when facts matter most.
CMC
