
The Grenada Election: Results, Causes and Consequences



Introduction

- We present an analysis of the outcome of the recent election.
- What we did is to take the numbers from the electoral office and with a series of calculations generate additional numbers to tell a story of what happened on February 19, 2013.
- The numbers were detail in that it captured every polling division as well as sub-polling divisions.
- You would no doubt be aware of the fact that there was a major swing in voters' preference from the 2008 election. But what was that swing? What was the magnitude of that swing? Why was there such swing? What are some consequences of the swing? These are some of the issues we would attempt to explore tonight.

Quotes

- Politics is almost as exciting as war, and quite as dangerous. In war you can only be killed once, but in politics many times. (Churchill).
- Politics have no relation to morals. (Niccolo Machiavelli).

• A leader is a dealer in hope. (Napoleon Bonaparte).

• A genuine leader is not a searcher for consensus but a molder of consensus. (Martin Luther King Jr.).


- **The Swing:** it does not mean that people who voted for NDC in 2008 turned and voted for NNP in 2013 and that's it. That we do not know definitively. We simply do not know what each individual voter who voted in 2008 did in 2013 assuming that they were registered to vote in 2013.
- What we do know is that the proportion of registered voters who voted for NDC in 2008 was more than the proportion of registered voters who voted for NDC in 2013.
- We also know that the proportion of votes cast for NDC in 2013 was less than what NDC received in 2008.
- This means that the NDC was unable to maintain its support base as a proportion of registered voters and as a proportion of actual voters.

- At the same time, the proportion of registered voters who voted for NNP in 2013 increased relative to 2008; and the proportion of actual voters who voted for NNP in 2013 also increased.
- This meant that the NNP was successful it growing its support base as a proportion of registered voters and as a proportion of actual voters.
- Note that if NDC won a seat by, say, 200 votes in 2008 then, other things being equal, NNP would require 101 votes from NDC to be victorious in that constituency.
- NNP does not have to first wipe out the 200 votes and then get more votes above the 200 mark.

- So we had a fall in the proportion of votes going to NDC while the proportion of votes going to NNP grew.
- Similarly, the proportion of registered voters voting for NDC declined while the proportion of registered voters voting for NNP increased.
- So you had two forces moving in opposite directions. One force reducing the proportion of registered voters (& votes cast) who voted for NDC in 2013 and the other force increasing the proportion of registered voters (& votes cast) who voted for NNP in 2013.
- It's the combined effect of those two forces we call *the swing*.

- The swing would therefore include the following:
- 1. Those who voted for NDC in 2008 and voted for NNP in 2013.
- 2. Those who voted for NDC in 2008 but did not vote in 2013.
- 3. Those who voted for NDC in 2008 but did not register to vote in 2013.
- 4. New/first time registrants who did not vote for NDC in 2013.
- So swing is the gap that separated NDC from NNP given the 2013 election results compared with the gap that separated them following the 2008 election results.





Broad National Results

Category	2008	2013	2013 -2008	% Change
NDC	28,996	22,337	-6,619	-22.83
NNP	27,194	32,205	5,011	18.43
NDC - NNP	1,802	-9,828	-11,630	-645.39
Total Votes Cast	56,928	55,058	-1870	-3.28
NDC as % of Votes Cast	50.93	40.64	-10.29	33
NNP as % of Votes Cast	47.77	58.49	10.72	
NDC-NNP as % of Votes Cast	3.17	-17.85	-21.02	
Registered Voters	71,090	62,155	-8,935	-12.57
NDC as % Reg. Voters	40.79	36.00	-4.79	
NNP as % Reg. Voters	38	58.49	20.24	
NDC-NNP as % of Reg. Voters	2.53	-22.49	-25.03	
Turnout Rate	80.08	88.58	8.50	

Parish Results

Category	St. George	St. Patrick	St. Andrew	St. Mark
NDC	7,349	2,770	5,899	785
NNP	12,161	3,145	7,839	1720
NDC - NNP	-4,812	-375	-1,940	-935
Total Votes Cast	19,596	5,958	13,754	2,505
NDC as % of Votes Cast	37.50	46.49	42.89	31.34
NNP as % of Votes Cast	62.06	52.79	56.99	68.66
NDC-NNP as % of Votes Cast	-24.56	-6.29	-14.10	-37.33
Registered Voters	22,702	6,575	15,278	2,830
NDC as % Reg. Voters	32.37	42.13	38.61	27.74
NNP as % of Reg. Voters	53.57	47.83	51.31	60.78
NDC-NNP as % of Reg. Voters	-21.20	-5.70	-12.70	-33.04
Turnout Rate	86.32	90.62	90.02	88.52

Parish Results

	St. David	St. John	Carriacou	Totals
NDC	2487	1745	1341	22376
NNP	3168	2268	1969	32270
NDC - NNP	-681	-523	-628	-9894
Total Votes Cast	5684	4047	3325	54869
NDC as % of Votes Cast	43.75	43.12	40.33	40.78
NNP as % of Votes Cast	55.74	56.04	59.22	58.81
NDC-NNP as % of Votes Cast	-11.98	-12.92	-18.89	-18.03
Registered Voters	6346	4561	3840	62132
NDC as % Reg. Voters	39.19	38.26	34.92	36.01
NNP as % of Reg. Voters	49.92	49.73	51.28	51.94
NDC-NNP as % of Reg. Voters	-10.73	-11.47	-16.35	-15.92
Turnout Rate	89.57	88.73	86.59	88.31

Margins of Victory

Highest & Lowest Margins of Victory					
	Absolute Margin	Percent of Votes Received	Percent of Registered Voters		
Highest					
SGNW	2,356	88.77	78.43		
SSG	1,224	59.1	50.4		
St. Mark	935	68.66	60.78		
Lowest					
SPE	130	51.6	46.7		
SGNE	161	51.55	45.1		
SPW	245	53.79	48.79		

Turnout

Highest	Highest and Lowest Turnout Rate by Constituency				
	Constituency	Turnout Rate	Percent Increase from 2008		
Highest	SASE	91.21	12.39		
	SANW	90.95			
	SPW	90.71	8.01		
Lowest					
	SGS	85.28	8.53		
	TSG	86.34	10.31		
	SGNE	87.49	8.43		
	Nationally	88.58	8.5		

Constituency Swing Analysis

Town of St. George					
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	16.217	16.217	16.26	479	-776
Regis. Voters	13.415	13.415	16.3	475	-770
		St. George	North West		
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	8.428	8.428	8.24	2356	502
Regis. Voters	10.807	10.807	8.24	2350	502
		St. George	North East		
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	13.78	13.789	13.94	4.64	1001
Regis. Voters	11.046	11.046	13.94	161	-1321
		St. Geor	ge South		
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	16.451	16.452	16.82	1774	1076
Regis. Voters	13.488	13.488	16.82	1224	-1976
St. George South East					
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	11.726	11.727	11.93	F03	956
Regis. Voters	10.042	10.042	11.93	592	-856

Constituency Swing Analysis

St. David					
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	12.457	12.458	12.57	681	-1474
Regis. Voters	10.636	10.636	12.57	001	-1474
		St. I	Mark		
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	5.588	5.588	5.35	024	775
Regis. Voters	6.003	6.003	5.35	934	275
		St.	John		
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	9.68	9.69	9.84	500	011
Regis. Voters	8.29	8.29	9.94	523	-811
		St. Pati	rick East		
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	4.24	4.245	4.3	120	224
Regis. Voters	3.68	3.68	4.3	130	-234
St. Patrick West					
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	8.035	8.036	8.05	245	FDD
Regis. Voters	6.949	6.949	8.05	245	-533

Constituency Swing Analysis

		Carr	iacou		
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	5.329	5.33	5.36	628	220
Regis. Voters	4.771	4.771	5.36	020	330
		St. Andrew	/ North East		
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	5.49	5.49	5.52	433	406
Regis. Voters	4.95	4.95	5.52	455	400
		St. Andrew	North West		
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	9.57	9.57	9.64	240	677
Regis. Voters	8.38	8.38	9.64	340	-627
		St. Andrew	/ South East		
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	12.38	12.38	12.4	787	-817
Regis. Voters	11.24	11.24	12.4	/8/	-917
St. Andrew South West					
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	9.509	9.509	9.51	323	-425
Regis. Voters	7.98	7.98	9.51 March 7, 2013		16

Parish Swing Analysis

Parish of St. George					
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	13.82	13.82	13.91	4812	-383
Regis. Voters	11.81	11.81	13.91.	4012	-365
		Parish of	St. Patrick		
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	6.315	6.315	6.36	252	-767
Regis. Voters	5.46	5.46	6.36	353	
		Parish of S	St. Andrew		
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	9.433	9.34	9.46	1040	2008
Regis. Voters	8.28	8.28	9.46	1940	-2608
Parish of St. Mark					
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	5.588	5.588	5.35	935	275
Regis. Voters	6.003	6.003	5.35		213

Parish Swing Analysis

Parish of St. David					
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	12.457	12.457	12.57	604	1 4 7 4
Regis. Voters	10.638	10.638	12.57	681	-1474
		Parish o	f St. John		
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	9.689	9.689	9.84	533	-811
Regis. Voters	8.292	8.292	9.84		
		Parish of	Carriacou		
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	5.329	5.329	5.36	C 20	220
Regis. Voters	4.771	4.771	5.36	628	330
All Parishes: Nationally					
Swing By	Own Swing	Butler Swing	Steed Swing	Margin	08 -'13 Diff
Votes Cast	10.599	10.599	10.66	0004	11606
Regis. Voters	9.229	9.229	10.66	9894	-11696

- 1. Leadership Issue: Weak: a leader that appears to know what he does not want but appears not to know what he wants; leading to gaps in decision making.
- 2. Uncharismatic; wooden with an appearance of swimming in too deep a pond; almost as if the reach was longer than the grasp.
- 3. Vaporous vision with lacking conceptual clarity making it difficult to translate whatever visions that was in the mind into concrete policy actions.
- It is difficult to convince someone with a foggy, unclear vision and more difficult it would be to spur them into action.

- 3. Poor communicator (ion) which compounded the problems associated with the misty vision and lack of charisma. Some say it was bad P.R.
- 4. Limited inclusiveness leading to the perception of "the know it alls". Little engagement of critical social partners (stakeholders). Political disengagement; & the party became a spectator in the fiftieth row.
- 5. Weak advice given to the party and government; allegedly given and accepted by the leader (and leadership) of NDC.
- Some of the key advisors were claimed to be non-members of the NDC, non-government operatives, non-members of Parliament and above all, less than technically sound and politically savvy.

- 6. Poor performance in government with particular reference to the most challenging issues facing Grenada, viz. unemployment, poverty and income disparity (widening income gap).
- Following a growth rate of 6.26% in 2007 we had growth rates of:
- a. 1.69% in 2008;
- b. -5.68% in 2009;
- c. -1.68% in 2010;
- d. 0.41% in 2011 and
- e. a preliminary estimate of -0.71% in 2012;

- f. Giving an average economic growth rate of -1.23%. over the period NDC has been in government.
- With such economic performance there could hardly have been any movement in tackling the problems of unemployment, poverty and income disparity. In some sense there was a destruction of human capital.
- In the face of such hard economic conditions there was what appeared to be a seeming catastrophe of indifference and a kind of apostolic blindness to the plight of people.

• The NDC as a party was not looking ahead and it fell behind.

- 7. Fractured party.
- Expulsion and the consequent dismemberment of crucial sections of the electioneering machinery of the NDC.
- -Uncertainty over the candidates stemming from the perceived need to complete the purge of perceived "rebel supporters"
- Time consumed in conflict management detracted from good governance reducing the so called core values of the NDC to "popular" jingles.
- -A further effect may have been to set the party (collectively and/or at least some individuals) on a course of self doubt.

- The publicly declared artificial separation between party and government that was in part driven by the need to neutralize the perceived increasing influence of the "rebels" in the party. PM Rally vs. NDC rally.
- The attempt was to offer constitutional power as the sole power in the political discourse. The effect of this may have been to deepen the divide between party members who were in government (only a few) and those who were not.

 But it is the party that get you in government and once this was realized (closer to the time of reckoning) scrambled attempts had to be made to rebuild; a rebuilding that would have been difficult and conflict ridden going in to an election.



- 8. Do as I say and not as I do.
- The acknowledged receipt of funds into the personal bank account of the PM and the resistance to the disclosure of the source of the funds wounded the core values of accountability, transparency and good governance.
- In short there appeared to be a contradiction between expected behavior on the basis of the "core values" and the actual behavior of some influential political operatives.
- 9. All these may have led to what appeared to be a disjointed campaign.

- -A campaigned that spoke less about hope and more about fear. People were now simply not fearful of fear anymore; they were tired of fearing fear.
- They wanted a sense of hope for the future and that was not fully offered by the NDC. The story of 2013 was practically the same story of 2008; repackaged.
- The massage of the NDC during the election campaign was a hard bumper sticker and by that time the party was drinking from a fire hose.
- -All these placed the NDC at the bottom of the election food chain. They became low hanging fruits.

- There were simply too many moving parts and the NDC as a party became *electile dysfunctional*.
- By that time the NNP had one speed: it was peddle to the metal; catch me if you can.
- And the NNP was revving their political and party engines more than year before the election date was announced.
- The confluence of all the factors mentioned above meant that by the morning of February 19th it was game over.
- The NDC and its supporters were then placed in a state of stupendous disbelief and began externalizing the blame as a means of "dissonance reduction".

- As one caller on George Grant's Sunday morning (Feb 24th) programme said:
- In Grenada's politics you have
- 1. Power
- 2. Privileges
- 3. Party
- 4. People and
- 5. Peter.
- NDC paid attention to all the Ps with the exception of people.

- Large turnout shows that Grenadians take their civic duty seriously. Such turnout occurred in 2008 when NNP was defeated; now in 2013 it led to the defeat of NDC. Maybe it was disgust in 2008 and greater disgust in 2013. (Youth)
- But that sense of civic duty should go beyond the election period and seek to influence the direction of national governance; more so as there is no Parliamentary opposition.
- Participation. 15: 0 opens up greater possibilities for people to more directly participate in governance rather than through Parliamentary representatives.
- Governance can also be influenced by the behavior of organized interest groups. Indeed they can influence governance more so in the absence of opposition.

- **Democracy.** There is an argument that **15** : **0** not good for democracy as 40.64% of voters and 36.0% of registered voters would not be represented.
- In the first instance the elected members of the House of Representatives are there to represent the entire constituency that elected them and not only those in the constituency who voted for them.
- In any case, the elected representatives will not know all constituents who voted for them.
- To make such an argument (that 15:0 is bad) would be at the same time to implicitly argue that democracy (from the standpoint of Grenada's constitutional electoral set-up) is not good for democracy.

- The Grenada constitutional electoral system allows for such an outcome (15:0); further could it not be legitimately argued that the outcome expresses the democratic wishes of the people?
- While opposition parties are not in Parliament, that does not preclude them from participating in governance. You don't have to be in the formal constitutional structure to influence the course of governance.
- Indeed, you could be part of the constitutional parliamentary structure and provide weak representation in Parliament which would amount to no representation from the standpoint of the formal constitutional structure.

- In any case, to what extent can we justifiably say that Parliamentarians in opposition truly "represent" the interest of those who voted for them to be in opposition. (Indeed, did they really consciously voted for them to be in opposition?)
- **Reform.** The **15** : **0** situation could be used to push through some constitutional reforms which could include some formal structure of contact with constituents and maybe a provision for representative recall.
- It can be used to foster constitutional reform to accommodate the desire to form an economic union in the OECS. A proper economic union requires the delegation of legislative power from national governments to a regional legislative assembly & that requires constitutional changes.

- Some of these constitutional reforms require a two thirds majority vote in favor in Parliament.
- **Division.** Post election seems to have led to a more politically polarized society compounded by a degree of animosity.
- In part, this may have resulted from the degree of foul mouthing during the campaign and the responses coming from some quarters following the election results.
- There is certainly a level of hatred that is not entirely invisible to the naked eye.
- No wonder that PM Mitchell acknowledged that one of his task and a legacy he would hope for is that of forging national unity.

- To the extent that the political division continues then socioeconomic development of Grenada would be held back.
- **Third Party.** Another consequence of the election is what appears to be closing of the door (and locking it after its closing) on third party alternative in Grenadian politics.
- There is little in the consequences of the election results that would strongly suggest that there are promising signs for the emergence of a third party in Grenadian politics.
- Similarly there is little to suggest that there is any maneuverable room for independent candidates. So both third parties and independent candidates would be climbing a mountain whose pinnacle they are unlikely to reach.

For the NDC:

- It is quite possible that the NDC will undergo some fundamental changes. The party has been severely wounded; some go so far and say that the party is not at a deadlock but it is dead.
- If the NDC is brutally honest with itself it will come to the reasonable conclusion that there is a fundamental leadership problem that it has to resolve and resolve sooner rather than later.
- The party may stall on this issue in an attempt to convey the impression that those who may be capable of assuming leadership are not "power hungry".

- The dept and breath of the leadership change would also have to be addressed. Should it be restricted to the leader or should it be wide enough to include other "leaders" of the party.
- The need for a generational shift in leadership seems clear. The party cannot hope to be vibrant and attract fresh blood with the "old guard" that returned to the party in September 2012.
- A political party is like any organism. It must adapt with changing environment, it must evolve or else it would die. The old guard is already dead. Its political Darwinism.
- A change in leader and/or leadership would or should generate a different set of "core values" that are more aligned to prevailing needs and sentiments of society.

- The longer that leadership shift takes the greater the likelihood of NDC remaining in the doldrums.
- The length of time it takes may depend on the extent to which the current leadership accepts responsibility for the party's defeat & in some cases recognize that their shelf lives have expired.
- The NDC is likely to be out of power for at least ten years unless the NNP makes humungous mistakes. That is not entirely impossible but it is more unlikely given the heft of experience it has in politics and in government.
- Further, with electoral lead it (NNP) has, its defeat will require a swing of a magnitude that most likely must be greater than the swing of 2013.

For the NNP:

- The NNP will also face the issue of a changing of the leadership guard. However, it is not under the kind of pressure to do so compared to the NDC.
- As a party in government the NNP would have to "deliver"; that is to say, address the critical issues of unemployment, poverty and income disparity.
- It will also have to forge a sense of national unity; and one may add, a minimization of the color schism.
- NNP therefore has a heavy national responsibility to bear.

- In addressing that weighty national responsibility it has to manage the expectations of people. This NDC did not do well.
- In so doing, the quick fix mentality, or "eat ah food" mentality must be addressed. At the end of the day it is only through increased productivity that we can have sustained economic growth. There is no other way. One should not be paid for doing nothing or for continuously doing the same thing inefficiently.
- And it is only through sustained economic growth that we can address the central problems of unemployment, poverty and income disparity.
- Finally, national responsibility requires a form of social compact to minimize social and economic conflicts which affect productivity.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH

• The four seats NNP held going into the 2013 election increased their margin of victory.

 The eleven seats held by NDC going into the 2013 election recorded a decline sufficiently strong as to wipe out their 2008 victory. How we think shows through in how we act. Attitudes are mirrors of the mind. They reflect thinking. (David Joseph Schwartz)